What should we hold on to? Virtue ethics in an age of AI ubiquity
A young man talking about his experience at university makes a point about exam halls that I keep coming back to. When a university spaces the desks six feet apart, he says, it is doing students a favour. The arrangement changes the situation in which students are asked to act. They still have responsibilities, and the university has taken some responsibility for the conditions in which they have to exercise them.
His starting point is the sheer ubiquity of AI. It’s in the search engine, the code editor and the app where you take notes. You can be offered help before you’ve decided whether you want it. He describes what that feels like in a competitive academic environment. If you believe everyone else can finish the work faster, or get a better mark, doing it yourself can feel like accepting a disadvantage. I recognise something of that calculation in my own working life.
The judgement I want to hold on to
In writing about my own use of AI in academic writing, I’ve kept coming back to reading. AI has helped me identify literature I’m genuinely excited to read. And then I have to create the situation in which I actually do that reading.
Sitting with a text takes time. I might read a passage, think I’ve understood it, and come back the next day to find I’d read my own assumptions into it. Sometimes I need to ruminate on an argument before I can see what it changes about the question I started with. I know, from years of doing this, what that time can give me. I still struggle to make it.
And there’s everything else. There are reports to write, bids to prepare and administrative tasks that seem eminently delegable. Sometimes the choice feels very ordinary. Do I do this myself and work over the weekend, or do I use AI and have a weekend with my family? Time with my family has a claim on my judgement too. Where AI can take on work I can responsibly delegate, using it can help me give time to things I value.
That still leaves me with two questions. Can I stand behind the judgement I’m making today? And am I sustaining the habits that will let me make good judgements in the future?
What virtue ethics adds
Virtue ethics helps me think about the connection between a decision I make today and the kind of academic I’m becoming. For Aristotle, we develop virtues through practice. Over time, what we repeatedly do shapes what we’re disposed to notice, care about and act on. He calls the capacity to deliberate well about how to act in particular circumstances phronesis, or practical wisdom. In my case, that means asking what this piece of work calls for, what I owe the people who’ll rely on it, and what else has a legitimate claim on my time (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.1 and VI.5).
Take the decision to use AI to synthesise a set of readings. For a particular purpose, that might be a decision I can stand behind. But suppose it becomes my usual way of encountering an argument. I’ll have fewer occasions to puzzle over what an author means, to notice where a claim is more tentative than it first appeared, or to find myself persuaded by something I initially resisted. Those are among the experiences I draw on when I judge whether a synthesis has done justice to the material. So I can make a reasonable decision about the work in front of me and still have reason to ask what happens if I make that same decision every week.
Shannon Vallor’s Technology and the Virtues brings this question into technological life. Drawing on Aristotelian, Confucian and Buddhist traditions, she asks what qualities we need to cultivate to live well amid technological change (Vallor, 2016). In her introduction to a symposium on the book, Diane Michelfelder reports Howard Curzer asking how people develop moral habits in a period of constant change (Michelfelder, 2018, p. 274). That question has particular force for universities. The habits at stake take years to develop. A tool can change what we’re in the habit of doing in the space of a semester.
Wessel Reijers’s review asks us to attend more closely to how technology shapes the practices through which we develop and exercise virtue (Reijers, 2019, pp. e-24–e-25). When a synthesis appears at the top of a search, the first thing I encounter is already someone’s, or something’s, account of what matters. When I’m pressed for time, that account can become the point at which the search ends. The tool shapes the encounter. The working week helps determine whether I have time to go further. Both are part of the situation in which I’m supposed to exercise practical wisdom.
That’s the point at which my personal struggle becomes an educational question. If judgement develops through practice, then the conditions that give us time and reason to practise it are part of how we develop it. And those conditions matter especially for students, who are still finding out what their own judgement can do.
What are we asking of students?
I come to those decisions with years of practice behind me. Students are at an earlier point in that journey. They are learning how to interpret, evaluate and synthesise, how to make creative judgements, and how to recognise when the specifics of a situation call for a different approach. Yet we already ask them to decide how much of that work to delegate. We’re asking students to exercise the very judgement they’re still developing.
A student who receives a clear and plausible synthesis may have little reason to suspect what sustained engagement with the material might have yielded. The value of that engagement often only becomes apparent in the course of doing it. I know this and still feel the pull of the quicker route. How much can we reasonably expect students to see, especially when they believe their peers are taking that route and being rewarded for it?
This is where I find the idea of critical compassion helpful. It begins with taking seriously the cost of what we ask of students. It then asks us to look at our part in shaping that cost. What time do students have to stay with something difficult? What do our expectations tell them is worth spending time on? When we say we value judgement, where can students see that value reflected in what the university recognises and rewards?
I keep coming back to the way the student describes the university spacing the desks. He says it’s doing students a favour. I hear a kind of critical compassion in that. The university recognises that the way it arranges the room changes what it asks of the people sitting in it. It takes some responsibility for the situation before asking students to take responsibility for how they act.
What would it mean to space the desks in an education where AI is everywhere? In the exam hall, spacing the desks makes a particular action harder. As a metaphor, it opens up a more positive question. How do we make room for students to stay with a difficulty long enough to discover what their own attention, imagination and judgement can do? How much of that room can we reasonably ask them to make for themselves when the university helps determine what they have time for and what gets rewarded?
Eventually, we want students to be able to space their own desks. I mean being able to recognise when they need some room to think, to make that room where they can, and to decide when bringing AI in will help them think further. What would we have to change about the conditions we create for students to discover, for themselves, when that space is worth making?
References
Aristotle. (2019). Nicomachean ethics (T. Irwin, Trans., 3rd ed.). Hackett Publishing Company.
Michelfelder, D. P. (2018). Guest editor introduction to the book symposium on Shannon Vallor, Technology and the virtues: A philosophical guide to a future worth wanting. Philosophy & Technology, 31, 273–275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-018-0318-2
Reijers, W. (2019). [Review of the book Technology and the virtues: A philosophical guide to a future worth wanting, by S. Vallor]. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 29(1), e-17–e-26.
Vallor, S. (2016). Technology and the virtues: A philosophical guide to a future worth wanting. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190498511.001.0001



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